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Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard 
University of Edinburgh 
 
ABSTRACT. According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of 
propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; 
Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-
how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, 
particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward 
by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind 
of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which 
the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we 
submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when 
cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance. 
 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that knowing how to do something is just 
a matter of knowing some fact; knowledge-how just is knowledge-that.1 A popular and influential 
way to make the case for reductive intellectualism is via linguistic argument (Stanley & 
Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This line of argument often 
goes hand-in-hand with a second dialectical strategy, which is (roughly) to establish that 
knowledge-wh (e.g., knowledge-where, knowledge-what, knowledge-which) is a kind of knowledge-
that, and then further show that the linguistic properties of knowledge-how line up with those of 
knowledge-wh.2  
 Of course, it is incumbent on the reductive intellectualist to maintain that knowledge-
how and knowledge-that must not come apart, and this burden is not limited to just linguistic 
properties of knowledge-how and knowledge-that ascriptions. Epistemic properties are also fair 
game, a point that reductive intellectualists grant (e.g., Stanley 2011b, 215). We have argued 
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elsewhere (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how is not knowledge-that, because 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that differ in their resilience to a certain variety of knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck—viz., environmental epistemic luck.3 We shall not rehearse these 
arguments here. Rather, we want to move the argument past our negative case against reductive 
intellectualism by proposing a positive anti-intellectualist account of knowledge-how. In 
particular, we will be arguing that knowledge-how is a kind of cognitive achievement. The variety of 
anti-intellectualism we propose, however, parts ways with neo-Rylean anti-intellectualism in that 
we reject the view that one knows how to φ just in case one possesses the ability to φ. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §1, we show that cognitive achievement and 
knowledge-that come apart in both directions. In particular, we argue that cases involving 
environmental luck can feature cognitive achievements even though knowledge-that is absent. 
Furthermore, we argue that simple testimony cases can feature knowledge-that even though 
cognitive achievement is absent. In §§2-3, we show that states that involve cognitive 
achievement (e.g., understanding-why) come apart from knowledge-that in precisely those cases 
where knowledge-that and cognitive achievement come apart, and further, that knowledge-wh 
lines up with knowledge-that, and not with cognitive achievement. Finally, in §4 we employ the 
kinds of cases which demonstrate that cognitive achievement and knowledge-that come apart to 
show that knowledge-how lines up squarely with understanding-why (and more generally with 
cognitive achievements), but not with knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Furthermore, we 
propose a positive characterisation of a cognitive-achievement-based account of knowledge-
how, according to which: If one successfully Fs because of one’s ability (vis-à-vis F), then one 
knows how to F, and conversely, that if one knows how to F, then one is positioned to 
successfully F because of one’s ability (vis-à-vis F). 
 
 
1. COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT 
 
One influential proposal in contemporary epistemology⎯advanced as part of a particularly 
ambitious version of virtue epistemology⎯is the idea that we should conceive of knowledge-that 
as a specifically cognitive kind of achievement. ‘Achievement’ is here understood in a very 
inclusive sense as covering any kind of success which is because of the exercise of one’s 
(relevant) ability. So construed, certain kinds of successes fail to count as genuine achievements. 
A success⎯hitting the bull’s-eye with one’s bolt, say⎯is not an achievement if it is due to blind 
luck and not because of ability. Moreover, even if there is genuine ability on display⎯if, say, one 
 3 
skilfully fired the bolt⎯this won’t suffice for an achievement if there is not the right kind of 
relationship between the success and the ability. For suppose one skilfully fires a bolt at a target, 
and one hits the bull’s-eye of that target, but that luck intervenes along the way⎯say, a gust of 
wind blows the bolt off course, and another gust of wind fortuitously blows it back on course 
again. Here we have success and the relevant ability on display, but due to the intervening luck at 
issue there is not the right kind of relationship between them to suffice for an achievement. That 
is, the success is not because of ability, but is rather due to the fortuitous luck involved.4  
 As a rough account of achievements, this proposal is fairly plausible. It doesn’t quite 
match up to the ordinary language notion of an achievement in that it is too inclusive⎯raising 
one’s hand could constitute an achievement on this view, even though ordinary language would 
dictate otherwise⎯but we are at least plausibly capturing here a general phenomenon of which 
the ordinary language notion is a more demanding sub-class. Of course, one would like to be 
told how best to unpack the ‘because of’ relation, though this is not an issue that we can usefully 
explore here. There is thus another sense in which this proposal is rough, in that it is at present 
underdescribed.5 
 In any case, with this rough account of achievements in play one can see the attraction in 
regarding knowledge-that as a cognitive kind of achievement. That is, knowledge-that is 
cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that is because of the exercise of (the relevant) cognitive 
ability. On this view there is a simple explanation of why knowledge-that is lacking in the 
Gettier-style cases, in that while there is cognitive success and the relevant cognitive ability on 
display, the former is not because of the latter, but rather due to happenstance. Given that virtue 
epistemology is typically characterised by its insistence that cognitive abilities⎯where this is a 
category broad enough to include both our cognitive faculties and our intellectual 
virtues⎯should take centre-stage within epistemology, we thus get a distinctively virtue-theoretic 
account of knowledge-that.6 Call such a proposal robust virtue epistemology.7 
 Despite the surface attraction of robust virtue epistemology, it does face some fairly 
formidable problems. In particular, there are cases which seem to demonstrate that as an account 
of knowledge-that it is sometimes too strong and sometimes too weak, a combination which 
threatens to tear the view asunder (in that whatever the proponent of robust virtue epistemology 
does to deal with the one kind of problem will almost certainly make it harder for them to deal 
with the other kind of problem). Interestingly for our purposes, the case for thinking that robust 
virtue epistemology is too strong an account of knowledge-that turns on the distinction between 
environmental luck and intervening luck. 
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 Consider again the case described above in support of the idea that achievements are 
successes that are because of ability, which involved two gusts of wind which fortuitously 
cancelled each other out. This is clearly intervening luck, in that luck intervenes between the 
manifestation of ability (the skilful firing of the bolt) and the relevant success (the hitting of the 
target), such that the success could so very easily have been a failure.8 Intervening luck is not 
compatible with genuine achievements, as we noted above. Since most Gettier-style cases 
involve intervening luck,9 it is thus no surprise that robust virtue epistemology can comfortably 
handle such cases. The farmer who thinks she sees a sheep and so believes that there is a sheep 
in the field, but who is in fact looking merely at a sheep-shaped object, is not cognitively 
successful because of her cognitive ability, but rather because of the happenstance that a sheep is 
hidden from view behind the sheep-shaped object that she is looking at.10 Intervening luck is 
incompatible with achievements, and hence cognitive achievements (i.e., cognitive successes that 
are because of cognitive ability), which given that knowledge-that is also incompatible with 
intervening epistemic luck is thus far just the right result as far as robust virtue epistemology is 
concerned.   
 But consider now the relationship between achievements, and thus cognitive 
achievements, and environmental luck. Environmental luck concerns cases where nothing 
intervenes between the manifestation of ability and the relevant success, but where that success 
is nonetheless lucky in virtue of some feature of the subject’s environment.11 Imagine an archer 
who skilfully takes aim and who hits the bulls-eye without anything getting in the way betwixt 
shot and target. There is thus no intervening luck in play here. But suppose that there is 
environmental luck in play. Imagine, for example, that our archer’s shot could so very easily have 
been affected by freak gusts of wind but in fact wasn’t⎯she just happened to fire at the precise 
moment to avoid the freak gusts, which would have otherwise affected her shot. The archer’s 
success is thus lucky, in that it is a success that could so very easily have been a failure, but where 
this luck is of the environmental rather than the intervening variety. Here is the crux: Is this 
archer’s success any less of an achievement in virtue of being subject to specifically 
environmental luck? 
 We claim that the natural answer to this question is ‘no’. While intervening luck can 
undermine a genuine achievement, a success is no less because of ability if there is environmental 
luck in play. After all, although our archer’s success could so very easily have been a failure, the 
fact remains that her success is entirely down to her agency, in that what could have so very 
easily have intervened didn’t in fact intervene. That is, her success is clearly because of her 
ability, even while being lucky. Indeed, we submit that it is no less of an achievement to produce 
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a success that is because of ability which is lucky in this way than it is to produce a success that is 
because of ability and which is in addition not subject to environmental luck.12   
 What goes for achievements more generally also applies to specifically cognitive 
achievements. In particular, in cases of environmental epistemic luck an agent’s cognitive success 
is no less because of her cognitive ability than if the epistemic luck had been absent, and hence it 
qualifies as a cognitive achievement. But given the environmental epistemic luck in play the 
cognitive success is nonetheless lucky, and hence it follows that it is not a case of knowledge-
that. More precisely, knowledge excludes luck at least to this extent: when one knows, then one’s 
cognitive success cannot, given how it was formed, have easily been a cognitive failure.13  
 In order to see this, consider again the case we just offered to illustrate intervening 
epistemic luck. This involved a farmer getting a good view of a sheep-shaped object in suitable 
cognitive conditions and forming the true belief on this basis that there is a sheep in the field. 
Suppose now we vary this case so that it explicitly involves environmental epistemic luck. 
Imagine, for example, that the farmer really was looking at a genuine sheep, it was just that she 
was in an environment in which she could so very easily have been deceived by sheep-shaped 
objects into forming a false belief in this regard. In both formulations of the case, the farmer’s 
cognitive success is lucky, in that it is a cognitive success that could so easily have been a 
cognitive failure. This is why we judge both cases to not be instances of knowledge-that.  
 It is not in question that in the first case the farmer’s cognitive success does not 
constitute an cognitive achievement, since by anyone’s lights it is not a cognitive success that is 
because of her cognitive ability, as opposed to being due to the good fortune of there being a 
sheep hidden from view behind the sheep-shaped object that she is looking at. But what about 
the second case? In particular, given that the farmer was not in fact deceived, and is in fact 
forming her belief about whether there is a sheep in the field by getting to see a sheep in good 
cognitive conditions, why would we deny that this constitutes a genuine cognitive achievement? 
Put another way, even despite the environmental epistemic luck in play, isn’t her cognitive 
success because of the exercise of her cognitive ability?  
Compare the archer case involving environmental epistemic luck, describe above. We 
noted there that hitting the bull’s-eye through ability in an environment in which one could so 
very easily have been unsuccessful, but where one was not in fact unduly influenced by any 
external factors, does not prevent one’s success from being because of one’s agency, and so 
counting as an achievement. But what is different about the epistemic variant of this scenario 
just offered? Accordingly, by parity of reasoning, what we say about achievements more 
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generally should apply to specifically cognitive achievements, with the implication that they are 
compatible, unlike propositional knowledge, with environmental epistemic luck.  
The upshot of the foregoing is that the theory of knowledge-that offered by robust virtue 
epistemology is too weak, in that it is committed to treating lucky achievements as knowledge, 
even though knowledge excludes luck of this variety.14 But there is also a second class of cases 
which show that this theory of knowledge-that is also too strong, in that it is committed to 
denying knowledge-that to agents in scenarios where, very plausibly, such knowledge is 
possessed. 
The best way of bringing this point into sharp relief is by considering cases of testimonial 
knowledge-that which has been gained in conditions which are epistemically very friendly. So, 
for example, consider an agent finding out directions in an unfamiliar city by consulting an 
informant, where informants in these parts are, about these matters anyway, uniformly reliable, 
helpful, and so forth. In order for this to constitute a genuine case of knowledge-that, it is of 
course important that our hero should exercise some relevant cognitive ability in forming her 
testimonial belief. For example, it had better not be the case that she would ask anyone (i.e., she 
had better be sensitive to indications that someone is not a good informant about this subject 
matter, such as that they are clearly tourists), and it had better not be the case that she would 
believe anything that she is told (i.e., no matter how ridiculous it is). Crucially, however, at least on 
standard views in the epistemology of testimony, the exercise of very little cognitive ability can 
be enough for a subject to count as having testimonial knowledge-that in the right conditions. In 
particular, in favourable epistemic conditions, it is possible for agents to gain testimonial 
knowledge-that while to a large extent simply trusting their informant.  
Here is the crux. Would our agent’s cognitive success count as being because of the 
exercise of her cognitive ability? We suggest not. For while she has manifested some relevant 
cognitive ability, her cognitive success seems to be more down to the informant than due to her, 
in that her own cognitive abilities are playing a very minor role in generating this cognitive 
success. But this means that there is sometimes less to knowledge-that than cognitive 
achievement.15   
Knowledge-that thus comes apart from cognitive achievement in both directions, in that 
there are cases of the former which aren’t cases of the latter, and cases of the latter which aren’t 
cases of the former. Reflecting on the examples we have looked at, the moral is that while the 
notion of a cognitive achievement picks out a particular kind of success which is attributable to 
one’s cognitive agency, the relationship between knowledge-that and cognitive agency is more 
complex. For sure, knowledge-that requires the manifestation of relevant cognitive ability. Even 
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in the testimonial case just considered there was relevant cognitive ability on display. But we 
have also seen that knowledge-that can be dependent on factors outwith the subject’s cognitive 
agency too, in both a positive and negative fashion. That is, there are cases where very little 
cognitive agency is on display but which count as knowledge-that in virtue of the epistemically 
positive nature of the environment (e.g., the testimonial case just considered). And there are also 
cases in which a great deal of cognitive agency is on display⎯i.e., a degree of cognitive agency 
which would ordinarily suffice for knowledge-that⎯but which don’t count as knowledge-that 
due to the epistemically negative nature of the environment (e.g., the cases of environmental 
epistemic luck considered earlier).16 
 
 
2. UNDERSTANDING-WHY, KNOWLEDGE-THAT  
AND COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
Where epistemic states come apart from knowledge-that in exactly those cases where (as we saw 
in §1) cognitive achievement comes apart from knowledge-that⎯such that these states exhibit 
the same relationship to epistemic luck as cognitive achievements⎯there is a reasonable prima 
facie case for supposing that these epistemic states involve cognitive achievement. In order to see 
this point in action, consider the epistemic state of understanding-why. As we will see, 
understanding-why is (just like cognitive achievement and knowledge-that) incompatible with 
Gettier-style (intervening) epistemic luck, even though it is nonetheless compatible with 
environmental epistemic luck (just like cognitive achievement but unlike knowledge-that). 
Moreover, it is not the kind of epistemic state that can largely be acquired through trust of 
another (just like cognitive achievement but unlike knowledge-that ). 
Consider a subject⎯let’s call him ‘Campbell’⎯who comes home to discover that his 
house has burned down, and asks someone what caused this to happen. In the first version of 
the case, suppose (in a typical Gettier-style fashion) that Campbell asks a fake fire officer in fancy 
dress why his house burnt down and is by happenstance provided with a correct explanation 
(that it was due to faulty wiring, say). In the second version of the case, in contrast, hold fixed 
that the explanation given is correct but now suppose the informant is in fact a genuine fire 
officer, albeit surrounded by fake fire officers in fancy dress (who Campbell could have just as 
easily asked as the genuine fire officer, and who would have led him astray). 
It’s hard to deny that the first kind of case looks like an obvious kind of ‘Gettier’ case for 
understanding-why, in that the intervening epistemic luck at play prevents Campbell from 
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understanding-why his house burnt down. Given the epistemic luck involved, Campbell doesn’t 
gain knowledge-that in this case either. But, interestingly, the second version of the case seems to 
elicit a different response. Though the environmental epistemic luck at play in this second 
version of the case would be enough to undermine propositional knowledge that the house 
burnt down, the same doesn’t hold for understanding-why. Indeed, that Campbell could so easily 
been given the wrong explanation seems perfectly compatible with him having gained an 
understanding of why his burned down in this case.17 But if this is right, then notice that 
understanding-why and cognitive achievement align in that they are both incompatible with 
Gettier-style (intervening) epistemic luck while nonetheless being (unlike knowledge-that) 
compatible with environmental epistemic luck. 
Now for the other side of the coin: notice that understanding-why also appears to be 
lacking in just the kind of testimonial cases in which agents acquire testimonial knowledge-that 
but don’t exhibit the degree of cognitive agency which would suffice for a cognitive 
achievement. Consider again the case just offered above of Campbell discovering what caused 
his house to burn down. This time, however, let us stipulate that there is no epistemic ‘funny 
business’ going on, in that there is neither intervening nor environmental epistemic luck in play. 
Instead, he simply acquires his knowledge-that the house burned down due to faulty wiring from 
speaking to a genuine fire officer. 
 Presumably, Campbell has a good grasp of how faulty wiring might cause a house fire, 
one that is sufficient for him to be credited not just with knowledge-that, but also with 
understanding-why. But imagine that he passes on his knowledge of what caused the house fire 
to his young son, and that while the son knows what faulty wiring is, he lacks a solid conception 
of how faulty wiring might cause a house fire. Campbell’s son can come to know that the house 
burned down because of faulty writing by receiving this information from his father, at least so 
long as he is capable of being reasonably circumspect about who he receives testimony from and 
what he believes on the basis of testimony (i.e., such that he doesn’t believe everyone about 
everything). Of course, he will be to a large extent trusting his father’s word in this regard, but in 
these circumstances, and about a subject matter like this, such trust seems entirely compatible 
with the acquisition of testimonial knowledge. But given that Campbell’s son lacks a solid grip 
on how cause and effect might be related, can he be rightly said to understand why his house 
burned down? We suggest not. 
 Knowledge-that and understanding-why thus come apart in both directions. Moreover, 
the cases where knowledge-that and cognitive achievement come apart seem to be just the same 
kinds of cases where knowledge-that and understanding-why come apart. There may be a good 
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reason for this, in that there is at least a strong prima facie case for thinking that understanding-
why is a kind of cognitive achievement. Indeed, understanding-why seems to have the close ties 
with cognitive agency which we saw was not the case with propositional knowledge, in that 
knowledge-that is both positively and negatively dependent on factors significantly outwith the 
subject’s cognitive agency. That is, when one has understanding-why, it is always the case that 
one’s cognitive success is attributable to one’s cognitive agency (in the sense that the cognitive 
success is because of one’s exercise of relevant cognitive ability). That would explain why 
understanding-why is compatible with environmental epistemic luck, and also why knowledge-
that, where it falls short of cognitive achievement (as in the testimonial cases we have been 
looking at), does not suffice for understanding-why.18 
 
 
3. KNOWLEDGE-WH, KNOWLEDGE-THAT AND COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
Interestingly, while it is plausible to contend that understanding-why involves cognitive 
achievement, it seems pretty clear that knowledge-wh is not a cognitive achievement. For one 
thing, consider that knowledge-wh seems (unlike cognitive achievements, and thus 
understanding-why) to be incompatible with environmental epistemic luck in a way akin to 
knowledge-that. For another, this is the kind of epistemic state that can be gained by for the 
most part trusting the word of another (like knowledge-that, but unlike cognitive achievements, 
and thus understanding-why). In order to see these points, consider knowledge-why. 
We take it as obvious that Campbell can’t come to know why his house burned down by 
talking to a fake fire officer who happens to offer the correct explanation. Knowledge-why is 
thus incompatible with intervening epistemic luck (just like knowledge-that and cognitive 
achievements). Can Campbell gain knowledge-why where the epistemic luck in play is 
environmental? That is, can Campbell come to know why his house burned down by gaining his 
belief about why his house burnt down by happening to consult a genuine fire officer 
surrounded by a group of fakes who would have misled him (such that his true belief is due to 
luck)? We suggest not: if one knows why such-and-such is the case, then one’s knowledge cannot 
be subject to luck in this way.19 Genuine knowledge-why⎯like knowledge-that, but unlike 
cognitive achievements and thus understanding-why⎯precludes the possibility that one could 
easily be wrong.  
What about cases where knowledge-wh falls short of cognitive achievement? Does 
Campbell’s son (who, recall from §2, failed to understand-why his house burned down) know 
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why his house burned down? We maintain that he does. Indeed, it would be odd to attribute to 
him propositional knowledge that he knows that his house burned down because of faulty wiring 
and yet deny that he knows why his house burned down. If asked why his house burned down, 
he could give the correct answer, and do so because he formed his belief by being informed by 
an authoritative source. What could possibly prevent him from having knowledge-why in this 
case? Again, then, we find that knowledge-wh is lining up with knowledge-that, unlike 
understanding-why, which is lining up with cognitive achievement. 
 
 
4. KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
We’ve argued elsewhere that knowledge-how is (unlike knowledge-that) compatible with 
knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.20 While there’s much to be said for this claim, a simple 
way to see why it’s so is to consider a kind of twist on the LUCKY LIGHT BULB case, as 
offered in recent work by Yuri Cath (2011). Here is the case: 
 
LUCKY LIGHT BULB: Charlie wants to learn how to change a light bulb, but he knows almost 
nothing about light fixtures or bulbs. So he consults The Idiot’s Guide to Everyday Jobs. Inside, 
Charlie finds an accurate set of instructions describing a light fixture and bulb, and the way to 
change a bulb. Charlie grasps these instructions perfectly. And there is a way, call it ‘w1’, such that 
Charlie now believes that w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way described in 
the book. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely lucky to have read these 
instructions. For the disgruntled author of The Idiot’s Guide filled her book with misleading 
instructions. Under every entry she misdescribed the objects involved in that job, and described a 
series of actions that would not constitute a way to do the job at all. However, at the printers, a 
computer error caused the text under the entry for ‘Changing a Light Bulb’, in just one copy of 
the book, to be randomly replaced by new text. By incredible coincidence, this new text provided 
the clear and accurate set of instructions that Charlie would later consult. (Cath 2011, §1) 
 
Cath contends that Charlie knows how to change a light bulb, but that he does not know that w1 
is a way for him to change a light bulb. Cath thus takes the moral of this case to be that 
knowledge-how comes apart from knowledge-that. But this conclusion is controversial.21  
LUCKY LIGHT BULB clearly involves intervening epistemic luck. But imagine a 
variation of this case which concerns instead environmental epistemic luck. Suppose, for 
example, that Charlie is consulting a genuine, authoritative light bulb changing guide, which just 
happens to be surrounded by fakes, and had he opted to consult one of the fakes, he would have 
gained incorrect instructions. Does Charlie know how to change a light bulb? Whereas we would 
grant that it’s not obvious that Charlie has this knowledge-how in the original case (where the 
fake guide is consulted),22 the intuition changes dramatically when the luck at play is 
environmental. In particular, we suggest that given that Charlie has gained his belief from a 
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genuine authoritative light bulb changing guide, then he knows how to change to light bulb.23 In 
this respect, then, notice that knowledge-how is aligning with cognitive achievement (and thus 
understanding-why), and coming apart from knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. 
It is natural then to ask whether knowledge-how is present in cases of knowledge-that 
which fall short of a cognitive achievement. Going back to the LUCKY LIGHT BULB case, 
suppose that Charlie finds out how to change a light bulb by receiving this information from 
what he knows to be a reliable information source (and that there is, in addition, nothing 
epistemically amiss in his acquisition of this information), and that Charlie passes this 
information onto his young son. Let us stipulate that Charlie’s son exhibits the same level of 
cognitive ability as we saw exhibited in the testimonial case considered above. That is, while he 
wouldn’t have asked just anyone or believed just anything that he is told, it is nonetheless the 
case that for the most part he is merely trusting the word of his father. Nonetheless, his father is 
indeed authoritative in this regard, and the environment is epistemically friendly in all the 
relevant respects (in particular, it is not the case, for example, that Charlie’s son could so very 
easily have been deceived by his father).  
As we saw above, on standard proposals regarding testimonial knowledge-that, Charlie’s 
son will come to have knowledge-that in this case (i.e., knowledge-that such-and-such is how one 
goes about changing a bulb). But does he know how to change a light bulb? Sure, he can change a 
bulb, but there is plausibly more required for knowledge-how than that. What we are after when 
it comes to know-how is not merely the ability to produce a certain outcome, but rather a 
particular kind of epistemic relation that the agent exhibits with respect to that outcome. And 
sure, Charlie knows how to change a light bulb, since he can vouch for the epistemic source of 
his information. But the key question is whether Charlie’s son can come to acquire knowledge-
how in this case, given that he is for the most part simply trusting his father’s testimony. We 
suggest not. Indeed, we claim that such cases illustrate the demandingness of knowledge-how, in 
that it is not sufficient for knowledge-how that one merely has the ability to undertake the target 
activity. Instead, it is required that one’s cognitive success should be appropriately related to 
one’s cognitive ability, such that the former is because of the latter. Where this is not the case, as 
in the testimonial example involving Charlie’s son just considered, then the agent concerned 
does not qualify for knowledge-how.  
If the foregoing is right, then we should think of knowledge-how as a kind of cognitive 
achievement, and thus group it with understanding-why, in contrast to forms of knowledge-wh 
which are naturally grouped with propositional knowledge in terms of their relationship to 
epistemic luck. We hold that the idea that knowledge-how is essentially a kind of cognitive 
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achievement has a great deal of plausibility. After all, this is the proposal that knowledge-how is a 
type of cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability, and that seems just right.  
We noted above that knowledge-how is not to be identified with merely the ability to 
produce a certain outcome, since what we are after is a particular kind of epistemic relation that 
the agent holds with respect to that outcome. Significantly, this point about how knowledge-how 
requires more than the mere ability to produce a certain outcome, such that knowledge-how 
demands the right kind of relationship between cognitive success and cognitive ability, also 
provides us with the resources for dealing with a certain kind of reservation that might naturally 
be levelled at the proposal that knowledge-how is a kind of cognitive achievement. The worry is 
broadly as follows. If one is to reject intellectualism about knowledge-how, then presumably one 
will opt instead for its competitor proposal and adopt a form of neo-Ryleanism about 
knowledge-how. But on the anti-intellectualist neo-Rylean view, isn’t knowledge-how nothing 
more than the possession of a certain ability or disposition? But how then can one consistently 
argue that knowledge-how is a kind of cognitive success which is because of cognitive ability 
(i.e., a cognitive achievement) and argue that knowledge-how is nothing more than the 
possession of a certain ability?  
We think this potential objection is too quick. Consider, for example, Ted Poston’s 
(2009, 744) claim (originally presented as part of an argument that knowledge-how is impervious 
to Gettier-style cases) that if one can intelligently24 and successfully F, then one knows how to 
F.25 This is straightforwardly neo-Rylean because know-how is analysed in terms of the ability or 
disposition to do something (intelligently and successfully F). As Poston puts it, “If, for instance, 
Sally intelligently moves this way and that way with the goal of riding a bike and she succeeds 
then Sally knows how to ride a bike.” (Poston 2009, 744)  
If Poston’s suggestion is plausible, then a picture emerges for how knowledge-how might 
be conceived as a kind of cognitive achievement on the neo-Rylean model: we simply amend 
Poston’s account so that the ability and success components can’t merely be ‘accidentally 
satisfied’ conjunctively; instead, we stipulate that the success element be because of the ability 
element. This amendment is quite plausible: after all, if Sally succeeds at riding a bike always 
because of a benevolent demon and never because of her ability (which always ends up 
disconnected from her success, by the demon), then it seems rather implausible that she knows 
how to ride a bike (perhaps, we’d say, she never had the chance).26 Amended this way, and with 
the further amendment that we use the term “cognitive ability” as opposed to Poston’s more 
general term “intelligence”, Poston’s characterisation of knowledge-how would be: If one 
successfully Fs because of one’s ability (vis-à-vis F), then one knows how to F. If this is right, and 
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the converse holds⎯i.e., that if one knows how to F, then one is positioned to successfully F 
because of one’s ability (vis-à-vis F)⎯then we have an account of what it would be for 
knowledge-how to essentially involve cognitive achievement.27 The Sally case suggests that this 
sort of account has much to recommend it, in that it captures a clear insight about the 
relationship between ability and success in cases of knowledge-how, a relationship which is best 
explained by supposing that knowledge-how essentially involves cognitive achievement. What 
results, then, is a cognitive-achievement account of knowledge-how that is a viable alternative to 
both intellectualist views (given that knowledge-how and cognitive achievement come apart in 
both directions), and to neo-Rylean anti-intellectualists accounts according to which knowledge-
how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities.   
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We’ve argued here that knowledge-how is a kind of cognitive achievement. In doing so, we’ve 
strengthened our negative case against intellectualism (defended elsewhere) in the following way: 
we’ve shown that cognitive achievement and knowledge-that come apart in both directions, and, 
further, that knowledge-how essentially involves cognitive achievement. To the extent that 
knowledge-how involves cognitive achievement, then, we should reject intellectualist proposals 
which are committed to denying that knowledge-how and knowledge-that will come apart.  
 But in identifying knowledge-how with a particular kind of cognitive achievement, we’ve 
not merely challenged the intellectualist, but at the same time also challenged the traditional neo-
Rylean anti-intellectualist who insists that knowledge-how is just a matter of ability possession. 
Again, if our argument that knowledge-how is a kind of cognitive achievement is successful, then 
we have a clear explanation for why the neo-Rylean account should be rejected—namely, 
because knowledge-how is more demanding, in that it involves (beyond just the possession of 
certain abilities) that one’s successful performance be not merely accidentally a product of such 
abilities, but rather because of their exercise. We are thus proposing a new kind of anti-
intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in doing so offering a novel way to avoid some of the 
most obvious problems for both the most popular varieties of intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism.28 
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NOTES 
 
1  See Bengson & Moffett (2011a; 2011b) for a non-reductive version of intellectualism. 
2  For the most influential and sustained recent example of this strategy, see Stanley (2011b). 
3  See Carter & Pritchard (2013) for an argument to the effect that environmental epistemic luck, while incompatible 
with propositional knowledge, is nonetheless compatible with knowledge-how. It is thus concluded, contra the 
reductive intellectualist, that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart. 
4  For further discussion of this general notion of an achievement, see Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 2).  
5  There are two main proposals in the literature: Sosa’s (e.g., 2007) disposition manifestation account and Greco’s 
(e.g., 2010) causal explanatory account. In addition, some have argued that the ‘because of’ relation should be 
treated as an undefinable primitive (e.g., Zagzebski 1999). For further discussion of these different accounts of the 
‘because of’ relation and their relevance to particular renderings of virtue epistemology, see Kallestrup & Pritchard 
(2011)  
6  Note that we are using cognitive ability in the way that is common among virtue epistemologists—viz., to refer to 
intellectual virtues, broadly construed. Cognitive ability is a term Greco (2010) has popularized in part because it is 
prima facie compatible with different substantive accounts of intellectual virtues. Here, specifically, we have in mind 
the debate that persists between virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists: whilst virtue reliabilists conceive of 
intellectual virtues in a way that is akin to reliable faculties (e.g., memory, eyesight) that are appropriately integrated 
in one’s cognitive character, virtue responsibilists view the intellectual virtues as more akin to character traits that an 
agent can be praiseworthy for acquiring through habituation. At any rate, our use of ‘cognitive ability’ is not meant 
to be loaded in favour of either side of this debate, even though cognitive abilities are meant to pick out cognitive 
dispositions that are more fine-grained than intelligence simpliciter (in contrast to Poston (2009)). For more on the 
distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist conceptions of virtue epistemology, see Axtell (1997).   
7  For some of the key defences of robust virtue epistemology, see Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007; 2009), Zagzebski (1996; 
1999), and Greco (2010). Note that each of these proposals incorporates a different account of how one should 
unpack the ‘because of’ relation in play here. See also endnotes 5 and 6.  
8  While the idea that a lucky event is an event which could very easily have not obtained is widely endorsed in the 
literature, it is not completely uncontroversial. It would take us too far afield to defend this claim here, however. For 
discussion of how best to think of lucky events, and for further defence of this particular account of lucky events, 
see Pritchard (2005, ch. 5; 2013; forthcomingb). See also Pritchard & Smith (2004). 
9  This is certainly true, for example, of the cases cited in the original article⎯see Gettier (1963). 
10  This Gettier-style case was originally due to Chisholm (1977, 105). 
11  The distinction between intervening and environmental luck (and thus between intervening and environmental 
epistemic luck) is due to Pritchard (2009a, chs. 3-4; 2009b; 2012a). See also Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 
2-4) and Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011; 2012; 2013). 
12  In making this claim it is important, of course, to keep the details of the case fixed. That one is trying to hit a 
bull’s-eye in conditions where there are potentially freak winds in play is different from aiming for this same goal in 
normal conditions, and so requires different abilities. But we are talking about an agent aiming for the bull’s-eye in 
otherwise normal conditions who is (unbeknownst to them) subject to possible freak winds, which don’t in fact 
materialize. Our claim is that two counterparts, both possessing the same degree of ability, and in the same actual 
circumstances, will both exhibit achievements to the same extent, even if one of the agents happens to be in an 
environment in which circumstances could have been unfavourable for that achievement, but in fact weren’t. We 
take this claim to be intuitive, but for a thorough argument for this claim, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011).  
13  This claim about knowledge is usually understood as the thesis that knowledge demands safety. See Luper (1984; 
2006), Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000), and Pritchard (2002; 2005; 2007; 2012a; 2012b). For a 
comprehensive and up-to-date discussion of the merits of the safety condition for knowledge, see the exchange 
between Pritchard (2013) and Hetherington (2013). 
14  Of course, if one is persuaded by robust virtue epistemology, then one might be tempted to deny that knowledge 
requires safety. This is in fact just the route taken by Sosa (e.g., 2007, ch. 5), though it is obviously not a cost-free 
response to the problem in hand. For specific discussion of Sosa’s proposal in this regard, see Pritchard (2009a). 
15  For further discussion of the challenge posed to robust virtue epistemology by testimonial knowledge, see 
Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012). 
16  Elsewhere, one of the authors of this paper has described this phenomenon as the epistemic dependence of 
knowledge, where this has both a negative and a positive aspect. See Kallestrup & Pritchard (2013). 
17  It is helpful here to apply the ‘past-self’ test. Were Campbell to learn that there were plausible fake fire officers 
nearby, would he thus regard his former self as failing to understand why his house burnt down, given that he is 
aware that the person he asked was a genuine fire officer? Surely not. (And yet he surely would regard his past self as 
lacking propositional knowledge of why his house burned down). 
18  For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between propositional knowledge and understanding-why, see 
Pritchard (2009b), Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 4), and Carter & Pritchard (2013). See also Grimm 
(2006) and the exchange between Pritchard (forthcominga) and Grimm (forthcoming).  
 17 
 
19  Indeed, try applying the ‘past-self’ test here (see endnote 17). If Campbell were to subsequently discover that his 
belief about how his house burned down was only true as a matter of luck in this way, then he surely would not 
regard his past self as knowing why his house burned down.   
20  See Carter & Pritchard (2013). 
21  As we explain in Carter & Pritchard (2013, §1). 
22  For more on this point, see Carter & Pritchard (2013). 
23  Applying here the ‘past self’ test (see endnotes 17 and 19), if Charlie were to subsequently discover that he gained 
his beliefs about the right way to change a light bulb from a genuine authoritative light bulb changing guide (albeit 
one which could have easily been a fake), wouldn’t he nonetheless regard his former self as having known how to 
change a light bulb?  
24  It is worth reiterating that we are not, as Poston seems to be, equating cognitive ability with intelligence. We have 
a more specific notion of cognitive ability in mind which is standard fare in virtue epistemology (see endnote 6). It is 
worth noting, though, how we see the notion of intelligence fitting in. The story we have to tell here is a general 
one. Ryle (1946; 1949) originally defended anti-intellectualism in the context of attempting to explain intelligent 
action. An action has intelligence properties for Ryle in virtue of being guided by knowledge-how (a point the 
intellectualist can agree with). But, then, what is involved in possessing knowledge-how? The question we are 
addressing is thus a question the answer to which serves as part of an explanation for intelligent action.  
25  Poston’s (2009) argument has two premises, which Stanley neatly sums up as follows: 
“(P1) Gettier cases for know how, if they exist, require that the subject intelligently and successfully F, 
where F ranges over actions; (P2) If one can intelligently and successfully F, then one knows how to F.” 
(Stanley 2011b, 177) 
26  This amendment, that in cases of knowledge-how the intelligence and success element be connected in the way we 
propose, helps to block a worry Stanley has proposed to Poston’s contention that if one can intelligently and 
successfully F, then one knows how to F. Stanley (2011b, 178) appeals to Bengson, Moffet & Wright’s (2009) case 
of Irina, a figure skater who has a neurological abnormality that causes her to ‘act in ways that differ dramatically 
from how she actually thinks she is acting’ and, despite the fact she is seriously mistaken about how to perform the 
Salchow jump, performs (due to the abnormality) the correct sequences of moves so that she successfully performs 
the Salchow (Bengson, Moffet & Wright 2009, 138; Stanley 2011b, 178). Two points should be noted about this 
case. For one thing, it’s not clear that Stanley’s appeal to it is effective in objecting to Poston’s original contention 
that if one can intelligently and successfully F, then one knows how to F. This is because it’s not at all obvious that 
Irina is performing the Salchow intelligently. But even if we grant Stanley that she is performing the Salchow 
intelligently, the fact that she performs the correct sequence of moves is due more to her neurological abnormality 
than to her intelligence, and so Stanley couldn’t appeal to this case to undercut our amended version of Poston’s 
account, according to which one knows how to F just in case one can successfully F because of one’s intelligence (vis-
à-vis F). 
27  It is important to emphasise here that the relevant success element in the view we are proposing is not merely the 
acquisition of a true belief; if it were, it would be tempting to view our proposal as a kind of intellectualism. Rather, 
the success element is a kind of outcome; in the case of riding a bike, the success element will be moving one’s arms 
and legs in a particular way that counts as successfully riding a bike. We are open to the possibility that what counts 
as riding a bike (and, hence, what counts as satisfying the success condition) might be more demanding in some 
contexts than in others.  
28  We are grateful to Jesús Navarro Reyes for detailed comments. Thanks also to Yuri Cath, Ted Poston, Jason 
Stanley, and Cheng-Hung Tsai for helpful discussion.  
